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1. Preliminaries 
To his main work, Individuals (Strawson 1959) P.F. 
Strawson gave the subtitle: An Essay in Descriptive 
Metaphysics. “Descriptive metaphysics is content to 
describe the actual structure of our thought about the 
world” (Strawson 1959, 9). It is to be contrasted with 
‘revisionary metaphysics’, which “is concerned to produce 
a better structure” (Strawson 1959, 9). The general 
features of our conceptual structure lie submerged under 
the surface of language and therefore descriptive 
metaphysics has to go beyond the examination of the 
actual use of words and expose this general structure. 
There are categories and concepts, which in their most 
fundamental character, do not change at all. They are not 
technical concepts of special sciences, but commonplaces 
of the least refined thinking. It is with these concepts and 
categories, their interconnections and the structure they 
form, that the descriptive metaphysics is primarily 
concerned.    
In Strawson's metaphysical world, there are two 
categories of entities, viz., particulars and universals. 
Among the particulars, the material objects are basic 
particulars, in the sense that it is ultimately by making an 
identifying reference to particulars of these kinds, that we 
are able, in general, to individuate and identify items of 
other kinds, such as events. To identify any entity means 
to locate it in space-time; and material objects are the only 
entities, which constitute space-time-system. A particular is 
said to be identified, when the speaker makes an 
identifying reference to it and the hearer identifies it on the 
strength of the speaker’s reference. 
Persons are those basic particulars to which we 
ascribe consciousness. Thus, in Strawson’s ontology of 
particulars, both the material bodies and persons share 
equal status. Persons constitute a fundamental and 
irreducible kind of being. 
Persons are credited with physical characteristics, 
designating location, attitude, relatively enduring 
characteristics like height, colouring, shape and weight on 
the one hand and various states of consciousness like 
thinking, remembering, seeing, deciding, feeling emotions 
etc- on the other. How these two sorts of attributes are 
related to each other and why they are attributed to the 
very same thing, are the two questions Strawson 
discusses in the third chapter of the Individuals.  
Two possible attempts to meet these problems, 
according to Strawson, are “Cartesianism” and what he 
calls “No-Ownership doctrine” of the self. Strawson 
examines and rejects both of them and proposes to 
acknowledge the concept of person as primitive. 
 
2. Cartesianism and the “no-ownership 
doctrine” 
According to Cartesianism, when we speak of a 
person we are really referring to one or both of two distinct 
substances of different types, each of which has its own 
appropriate types of states and properties. States of 
consciousness belong to one of these substances and not 
to the other. Strawson rejects this theory because, for him, 
“The concept of the pure individual consciousness – the 
pure ego – is a concept that cannot exist; or at least, 
cannot exist as a primary concept in terms of which the 
concept of a person can be explained or analysed. It can 
exist only, if at all, as a secondary, non-primitive concept, 
which itself is to be explained, analysed in terms of a 
person”. (Strawson 1959, p.102)  
He argues as follows: it is a necessary condition 
for ascribing any states of consciousness, experiences etc- 
to oneself, that one should also ascribe them to others. 
Ascribing to others is not possible if we accept the 
Cartesian ego as the subject of all experiences or states of 
consciousness. For, to be the subject of a predication, 
something must be identified. Identification as we saw 
presupposes location in space-time. Cartesian Egos can’t 
be located in space-time; only bodies can be located 
spatio-temporally. So predicating a state of consciousness 
to an Ego, presupposes that the state must be predicated 
to a subject, which is a material body. 
In our day-to-day speech we use expressions like 
‘I am in pain’, ‘I had a severe pain’, ‘My pain…’ etc-. These 
expressions somehow suggest that I am the owner of this 
particular experience of having pain. According to the no-
ownership theorist, experiences can be said to have an 
owner only in the sense of their causal dependence upon 
the state of some particular body. This causal dependence 
is sufficient to ascribe one’s experiences to some 
particular, individual thing. But this causal dependence is 
not a contingent or logically transferable matter. We can 
own something only if its ownership is logically 
transferable. Thus, experiences are not owned by anything 
except in the dubious sense of being causally dependent 
on the state of a particular body.  
This theory, according to Strawson, is incoherent. 
The theorist denies the existence of the sense of 
possession but he is forced to make use of it when he tries 
to deny its existence. Strawson argues that any attempt to 
eliminate the ‘my’ (or any possessive expression) in f.i. “my 
experience” or “my headache” etc. would yield something 
that is not a contingent fact at all. It is simply wrong to state 
that all experiences are causally dependent on the state of 
a single body. But the theorist cannot consistently argue 
that ‘all experiences of person P means the same thing as 
all experiences of a certain body B’, for then the 
proposition would not be contingent, as his theory requires, 
but analytic. With “my experience” he means a certain 
class of experiences and this class of experiences are the 
experiences of a person. It is the sense of this ‘my’ and ‘of’ 
that he requires to deny. He cannot successfully deny that, 
because being ‘my experience’ is – for the experience in 
question - no contingent matter but necessary. That my 
headache is my headache is – for the headache – no 
contingent matter. 
 
3. The concept of person as primitive 
To get out of these difficulties, Strawson’s 
suggests acknowledging the concept of person as primitive 
i.e. as a concept that cannot be analysed further in a 
certain way or another. That means: “the concept of a 
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person is the concept of a type of entity, such that both 
predicates ascribing states of consciousness and 
predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical 
situation & co. are equally applicable to a single individual 
of that single type” (Strawson 101, 102). In other words, 
the states of consciousness cannot be ascribed at all, 
unless they are ascribed to persons (in Strawson’s sense). 
It is to this concept of person, not to the pure ego, that the 
personal pronoun ‘I’ refers. Thus the concept of a person is 
logically prior to that of an individual consciousness.  
Strawson names the predicates ascribing 
corporeal physical characteristics, M-predicates and those 
ascribing states of consciousness, P-predicates. All P-
predicates may not be said to be ascribing states of 
consciousness but they all imply the possession of 
consciousness on the part of that to which they are 
ascribed.  
P-predicates are essentially both self-ascribable 
and other-ascribable. One ascribes P-predicates to others 
on the strength of observation of their behaviour, but to 
oneself, not on the behaviour criteria. It is because of the 
special nature of the P-predicates, or of a class of P-
predicates. To learn their use is to learn both the aspects 
of their use. We speak of ‘behaving in a depressed way’ 
and of ‘feeling depressed’. Feelings can only be felt not 
observed, and behaviour can only be observed not felt. But 
to have the concept like ‘X’s depression’, the concept must 
cover both what is felt by X and what is observed by 
others. “It is not that these predicates have two kinds of 
meaning. Rather, it is essential to the single kind of 
meaning that they do have, that both ways of ascribing 
them should be perfectly in order”. (Strawson 1959, 110)  
  
4. Appreciation and criticism of Strawson´s 
theory 
Strawson makes an attempt to show that the 
concept of person is primitive or simple in the sense that it 
cannot be further analysed. The whole argument is based 
on a group of central P-predicates which are other-
ascribable and self ascribable. Persons cannot be defined 
as a union of mind and body because the possession of 
mental properties as well as physical properties 
presupposes that the owner is a person. His subtle point is 
that the criteria of application of any particular 
psychological state or property are indistinguishable from 
the criteria of application of physical properties unless the 
subject has already been identified as a person.  
However, we think that one must call to mind that 
Strawson’s theory of persons does not meet at least some 
important aspects of the mind-body problem, although he 
explicitly pretends to deal with it. His attempt, we think, has 
resulted not in solving the problem, but in escaping it or 
explaining it away. What he does is only to suggest that 
there is no problem with the concept of person, so to say, 
‘if you consider it like this’, that is to say, if you consider the 
concept in a non-Cartesian and non-physicalistic way, the 
problem vanishes. In other words: his suggestion to 
consider the concept of person as primitive does not solve 
the traditional problem of the relation between mind and 
body, ontologically considered. So he offers only a 
conceptual solution to a real problem. And it is the real 
problem with which philosophers of mind deal with, 
especially under the influence of modern neurosciences. 
For instance Strawson´s conceptual analysis cannot cover 
problems in the context of questions concerning mental 
causation. How should we explain the causal relevance of 
mental states in the physical world in a Strawsonian way?  
In addition to the above-mentioned general 
semantic problem, we believe in particular that it is simply 
not the case that the concept of person, as we have it even 
in our ordinary language, cannot be further analysed. As 
long as we can conceptually distinguish between M-
predicates and P-predicates of persons, are we not 
analysing “person”? As long as we speak of persons as, 
for instance, having intentions or making experiences, and 
of persons as having physical properties like weight or 
shape or something like that, are we not analysing them? 
Furthermore: The key idea of ascription of M-
predicates and P-predicates are, as we think, to be 
reconsidered. ‘To ascribe’ is to consider as ‘belonging to’. 
‘Belonging to’ can be understood at least in two senses. In 
the first sense, as we think Strawson does, M-predicates 
and P-predicates are ascribed to persons, as a kind of 
underlying substratum of these predicates. In the second 
sense, one might take it in a more ‘Russellian’ or ‘tropist’ 
way, i.e. persons, so to say, as made of M-predicates and 
P-predicates or properties. In the first Aristotelean sense 
persons are real subjects of properties; in the second 
sense persons are a kind of sum total or bundle of 
properties. We cannot deal here with the second 
alternative. But we want to point out that Strawson, as a 
theorist following the first way, must presuppose, that there 
is, necessarily, something that already exists, before you 
ascribe M- or P-predicates to it. But: if the concept of 
person has to be primitive, as Strawson´s theory requires, 
it should not be able to refer to something which exists, at 
least conceptually, without M-predicates and P-predicates.  
Another aspect of criticism may be that Strawson’s 
criteria can be applied to other living beings like animals 
(perhaps to plants and trees) too, without any 
modifications. At least a big class of P-predicates can be 
applied to any sort of animals. No doubt, animals also 
have experiences; they too feel pain and so on. Even the 
behaviour of plants can be interpreted in a vocabulary 
using P-predicates. If this is the case, how does Strawson 
distinguish between animals and plants on the one hand 
and human persons on the other, if at all he distinguishes? 
Or does he intend to raise animals and plants to the level 
of human beings and to credit them too with personhood? 
How to argue for this rather radical thesis? These and 
some similar questions are left open from Strawson´s 
treatment of the concept of persons. 
One has to admit that Strawson actually does not 
discuss this question whether animals can be ascribed the 
status of persons at all. Of course, he shouldn’t be 
accused of what he doesn’t deal with, but doing systematic 
philosophy we think we are to point it out.  
In this context it is also worth mentioning that it is 
difficult to distinguish between Strawson´s concept of a 
person and the concept of a human being, understood as 
the concept of a member of a biological species. Obviously 
the concept of a human being can also be analysed in 
terms of M- and P-predicates. Is Strawson of the opinion 
that there should not be such a distinction at all? – Then 
he is confronted with all the problems concerning the 
“traditional concept” of persons, which takes “person” as 
synonymous with “member of the species of human 
beings”. We just want to call to mind arguments from 
authors in the field of artificial intelligence research, who 
regard it as a kind of “racism” to exclude all sorts of 
computers or robots from personhood because of 
conceptual reasons. 
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5. Summary 
To sum up we can mention, that Strawson’s theory 
may be seen as a conclusive theory of the concept 
“person”. Nevertheless it cannot solve the main problems 
of a philosophy of personality or personhood as they are 
discussed nowadays in philosophy. It is an open question 
whether we can reformulate Strawson’s theory or we must 
refute it altogether. At any rate we can come to the 
conclusion that it is short-handed to be applied to a 
modern theory of personality without more detailed 
considerations. 
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